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Abstract: 
The theories of internalization and internationalization provide general factors of 
international market entry but are not precise about its timing. A model of waiting and 
growth options seizes the importance of flexibility to FDI decisions and centers the 
impact of uncertainty. The results of a panel study using aggregates of 5379 German 
entries to 22 countries suggest that uncertainty has a U-shaped influence on the 
probability of entry and a negative effect on the amount of capital whereas it leaves the 
share in capital unaffected. Investors seem to treat foreign subsidiaries as real options on 
internationalization but not on internalization. 
Keywords:  Foreign Direct Investment; Market Entry Mode; Real Options; 
Uncertainty; Timing 
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Non Technical Summary 
When firms contemplate international market entry by foreign subsidiaries, the option 
to defer entry (waiting option) interferes with the option to later enlarge the subsidiary 
(growth option). The values of both options rise with the uncertainty surrounding the 
investment. The paper analyzes the timing of market entry depending on the uncertainty 
and tendency of expected returns in the host country. In a panel study of German 
foreign direct investment in the industrialized countries, the probability of market entry 
reveals a U-shaped relationship with the course of uncertainty, which can be explained 
by the model of competing real options. The paper further investigates whether foreign 
investors use joint ventures as real options on upsizing them to fully-owned 
subsidiaries. The empirical findings turn out negative. Apparently, they only consider 
foreign subsidiaries in general as real options whereas they regard joint ventures as 
conventional investments. In contrast to earlier suggestions, interpreting international 
market entry as purchasing growth options seems to be more compatible with the view 
of internationalisation than with the view of internalization. The paper “Investment into 
new foreign subsidiaries under receding perception of uncertainty”, which also appears 
in the Bundesbank series, examines the enlargement of foreign subsidiaries as exercises 
of growth options.  
 
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Beim internationalen Markteintritt mit einer Auslandsgesellschaft überlagert sich der 
Wert der Option, den Markteintritt zu verschieben (Warteoption), mit dem Wert der 
Option, die Auslandsgesellschaft nach dem Markteintritt vergrößern zu können 
(Wachstumsoption). Die Werte beider Optionen steigen mit der Unsicherheit der 
Gewinnerwartung. Der Zeitpunkt des Markteintritts wird in Abhängigkeit der 
Unsicherheit und der Tendenz der Gewinnerwartung im Gastland untersucht. In einer 
Panelstudie deutscher Direktinvestitionen in den führenden Industrieländern zeigt die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit des Markteintritts einen U-förmigen Zusammenhang mit dem 
Verlauf der Unsicherheit, was sich durch das Modell konkurrierender Realoptionen 
erklären lässt. Im weiteren richtet sich die Analyse auf die Frage, inwieweit 
ausländische Investoren Joint Ventures als Realoptionen auf die Erweiterung zu 
vollbeherrschten Auslandsgesellschaften nutzen. Die diesbezüglichen Befunde sind 
negativ. Offenbar werden von ihnen nur Auslandsgesellschaften im allgemeinen, nicht 
aber Joint Ventures im speziellen als Realoptionen betrachtet. Die Interpretation des 
internationalen Markteintritts als Erwerb einer Realoption beim scheint daher im 
Widerspruch zu bisherigen Vermutungen eher mit der Perspektive der 
Internationalisierung als mit der Perspektive der Internalisierung vereinbar zu sein. Die 
Vergrößerung von Auslandsgesellschaften durch nachfolgende Direktinvestitionen als 
Ausübung solcher Realoptionen ist Gegenstand des Beitrags „Investment into new 
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INTERNALIZATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 
UNDER COMPETING REAL OPTIONS 
 
Timing and dimensioning foreign direct investment 
Firms that consider investing abroad need to decide about the time and mode of 
market entry. Choosing the right moment and volume of international entry is 
important, as its success is affected by uncertainty. On the one hand, a high degree of 
uncertainty suggests to wait and postpone the entry, even though cash flows will be lost. 
On the other hand, uncertainty calls for improving the access to local information and 
therefore suggests to enter as soon as possible. If so it will be advisable to keep the 
capital limited since, depending on the current level of uncertainty, there might be better 
opportunities for large investments. In effect, uncertainty seems to play an ambiguous 
role in the entry decision. This research sheds some light on its influence on the timing 
and dimensioning of initial foreign direct investment. 
There is a large body of literature on international market entry but a shortage of 
studies on its timing. Various studies of international entry treat the timing of 
investment by relative terms such as early and late (Ursacki/Vertinsky, 1992; Luo, 
1998; Delios and Makino, 2003) or first and second (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). 
Only a few studies consider the absolute point in time, i. e., the year of entry. Tan and 
Vertinsky (1996) draw on the theory of internalization (Buckley and Casson, 1976) and 
investigate the time by which 262 Japanese electronics companies enter Canada and the 
US. The study investigates entries by joint ventures vs. wholly-owned subsidiaries and 
uses numerous independent variables including the current market growth in the host 
country but does not incorporate the influence of uncertainty. Delios and Henisz (2003) 
build on the theory of internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) and consider 
the impact of political hazards in the host countries on 3867 international expansions by 
Japanese firms. The results do not distinguish between different extents of entry but 
suggest that the influence of political hazards is negative and moderated by the 
investor’s experience. Political hazards, however, may not be as relevant to foreign 
direct investment decisions as economic turbulences are (Hule, 2000). According to   2 
time series raised by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003), the 
industrialized countries, which account for a major share of foreign direct investment, 
show a high and rather constant level of political stability. Furthermore, political 
hazards represent a downside risk whereas uncertainty may comprise both up- and 
downturns. Empirical evidence on the impact of the host country’s economic volatility 
on the timing of entry is weak so far. 
The existing studies on the timing of foreign direct investment use the established 
theories of internalization and internationalization as a background but synthesize the 
models of entry by arguments from other origins. It seems that traditional approaches to 
international entry need to be enriched for a dynamic analysis. Buckley and Casson 
(1998) state that early models of the multinational enterprise did not foresee the rising 
importance of uncertainty in today’s foreign direct investment decisions. Therefore, 
Buckley and Casson propose a new approach, the theory of real options. Through an 
option lens, the time of entry is the moment by which the internationalizing firm 
exercises the waiting option to invest. At the same time, the firm acquires a growth 
option to be exercised by a later investment. The values of both option types rise with 
uncertainty. Their trade-off is supposed to guide the timing and dimensioning of 
investment at entry. This paper seeks to develop and test an option model of 
international entry in order to contribute to the understanding of foreign direct 
investment. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section takes an 
option view to the known perspectives of internalization and internationalization and 
raises the question of compatibility. The third section employs a model of competing 
real options to explain the entry to a foreign market. The data from the German central 
bank, the measures and the econometric model are explained in the fourth section. 
Section five presents the results concerning the timing of entry and its volume as 
measured by the share and amount of capital. The final section discusses the results, 
reflects the limitations and derives implications for management and future research. 
 
   3
AN OPTION VIEW TO INTERNATIONAL ENTRY 
Internalization 
According to the “Long-run Theory of the Multinational Enterprise” by Buckley 
and Casson (1976), firms circumvent the imperfections of international markets by 
internalizing business processes concerning tacit knowledge, perishable goods, 
intermediate products and raw materials. However, internalizing markets may lead to 
reduced economies of scale, problems of cross-border communication and 
discrimination by host governments. Calvet (1981) tries to reconcile the theory of 
internalization with the transaction cost view of markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 
1975). The theory of transaction costs suggests to internalize transactions that feature a 
high rate of repetition, are surrounded by uncertainty and require specific investment. 
Casson (1985) points out that transaction costs are not exactly the same as the costs of 
internalization but overlap with respect to communication and control. Similar 
approaches to internalization were presented by Rugman (1980), Teece (1981) and 
Hennart (1982). Later contributions consider international joint ventures as an 
intermediate type between markets and hierarchies (Hennart, 1993; Buckley and 
Casson, 1996). Facing the costs of internalization, firms enter a foreign market by 
exporting, joint venturing or establishing a fully-owned subsidiary. The mode of market 
entry is characterized by the degree of control and varies from market over shared to 
hierarchical coordination. 
The notion of transaction costs to determine the degree of control at market entry 
receives support from several empirical studies (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; 
Hennart, 1991; Pak and Park, 2004) but leaves aside the issue of timing. Buckley (1988) 
recognizes a dynamic deficit of the internalization concept and proposes to integrate 
ideas from strategic management. However, even studies that enhance the approach by 
variables of corporate strategy leave the timing of entry unattended (Hennart and Park, 
1994; Madhok, 1998; Bradley and Gannon, 2000). The same criticism applies to 
Dunning’s (1981) eclectic paradigm that adds factors of competitive (Hymer, 1976) and 
location (Johnson, 1968) advantages but, in spite of further development (Dunning, 
2000) and recent support (Tse, Pan and Au, 1997; Mudambi and Mudambi, 2002; Tsai   4 
and Cheng, 2002), stays a static approach (Macharzina and Engelhard, 1991; Kutschker 
and Schmid, 2005). 
Buckley, Casson and Gulamhussen (2002) show that the choice of exporting, joint 
venturing and establishing a fully-owned subsidiary can indeed be a dynamic one. A 
firm contemplating entry to a foreign market and facing high uncertainty will seek to 
stay flexible. To this end, it may completely or partly defer the entry by equity. 
Exporting preserves full flexibility but impedes gathering local information. Sharing the 
control of foreign operations with a joint venture partner improves the access to local 
information and helps to reduce uncertainty while it requires committing resources only 
to a limited extent. Thus a joint venture can be a useful intermediate step to full 
ownership. 
Buckley, Casson and Gulamhussen develop a two-phase decision tree model to 
explain the choice of market entry by maximizing the expected profit. If success is very 
unlikely, the expected returns are negative. The firm will refrain from entering by equity 
to avoid losses. However, it thereby cuts the opportunity to benefit from a rising 
probability of success in the second phase. When the probability of success is 
intermediate in the first phase, the firm will choose a joint venture and thereby create an 
option on full ownership in the second phase, which turns out valuable when the 
probability happens to increase. If not, the loss is still limited. Under a high probability 
of success, the expected returns will be greatest when entering right away by a fully-
owned subsidiary. 
The decision tree model of the market entry mode has the potential to compensate 
for the dynamic weaknesses of the internalization concept. However, as a decision tree 
model, it does not exploit all benefits of real options theory. Other authors assign 
decision tree models to the category of net present value techniques (Trigeorgis, 1996; 
Hommel and Lehmann, 2001). It will be worthwhile to examine different real option 
models for their ability to reproduce foreign direct investment decisions. Another 
problem refers to the quality of international joint ventures as real options. Options 
theory is directed towards investing capital while choosing an institutional arrangement 
involves sharing capital with a partner. Control will only rise by additional investment if 
the joint venture partner agrees to a partial or full buy-out. Buckley, Casson and   5
Gulamhussen believe that transaction costs are lower between joint venture partners 
than between ordinary firms, making a deal with equity less difficult. Their second 
argument is that one partner may be better informed than the other, which is an 
advantage in negotiations about the purchase of equity. Empirical evidence on the use of 
joint ventures as real options on international market entry is limited to including buy-
out clauses in joint venture contracts. Reuer (2002) reports that a minority of foreign 
investors use such clauses to ensure a right of takeover. Evidence about domestic joint 
ventures serving as real options is mixed. In the study by Vassolo, Anand and Folta 
(2004), the impact of uncertainty on takeover is insignificant even if controlling for 
buy-out clauses. Kogut (1991) observes the probability of a takeover to rise when 
positive market signals arrive, though unexpected events may not imply a decline of 
uncertainty. Folta and Miller (2002) find that uncertainty exerts a negative influence on 
takeover but makes no significant contribution to its explanation. 
 
Internationalization 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) describe the internationalization 
processes of four Swedish firms and presume that, in general, firms enter a foreign 
market by an incremental “establishment chain”. International business starts by 
exporting occasionally. Later, firms contract intermediaries to sell their products abroad 
and gain first insights about the foreign market. Then they allocate resources for sales 
subsidiaries and collect more specific information. The chain is completed by 
establishing production sites abroad. 
Empirical studies show that not only Swedish but also US (Davidson, 1980), 
Japanese (Johansson and Nonaka, 1983), Turkish (Karafakioglu, 1986) and Spanish 
companies (Camino and Cazorla, 1998) use an incremental pattern of market entry. The 
Uppsala model explains this pattern by a self-reinforcing process of learning and 
investing in the foreign market (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Several Finnish firms, 
however, seem to ignore this rule (Björkman and Eklund, 1996). Neither do empirical 
studies of internalization or recent findings about “born global” firms support the 
prevalence of an establishment chain (Bürgel and Murray, 2000; McNaughton, 2000; 
Moen and Servais, 2002). In this regard, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) mention that a   6 
low level of market risk may require less experience and allow to leapfrog stages of the 
establishment chain. 
In a view of real options, uncertainty is central to the timing and dimensioning of 
investment at market entry. To stay with the model by Buckley, Casson and 
Gulamhussen (2002), the investor has the choice between a deferred, a partial, and a full 
investment. A partial investment creates a real option on up-sizing since it improves the 
ability to meanwhile gather information and run the investment more successfully than 
if it was deferred. At a low probability of success, the investor will defer the entry as 
long as the expected returns are negative. When the probability is intermediate, a partial 
investment is preferable. It carries the option but not the obligation to invest more at a 
later stage, depending on how conditions will evolve. At a high probability of success, a 
full investment promises the highest expected returns. 
Apparently, the options view is not only able to mirror the perspective of 
internalization but also the perspective of internationalization. Exporting corresponds to 
an omitted investment, joint venturing to a partial investment and establishing a fully-
owned subsidiary to a full investment. However, the analogy may depend on buy-out 
clauses that couple the issues of ownership and investment. The decision tree model 
considers the size of investment by three steps (no, partial and full investment). 
Considering such steps is in line with the internalization perspective of market entry by 
exporting, joint venturing or establishing fully-owned subsidiaries but appears 
unnecessary in the internationalization perspective of foreign direct investment, as an 
internationalizing firm is free to choose the size of investment. Also, the firm may 
continuously change the degree of control by adjusting the share in capital. For an 
option analysis, discrete entry modes are dispensable. 
 
MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL REAL OPTIONS 
Creating a Growth Option by Killing the Waiting Option to Invest 
A real waiting option is similar to a European call option at financial markets. As 
the models by Black and Scholes (1973) and Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) show, its 
value increases with the volatility of the stock price. Unlike financial options, real   7
options do not cease after a fixed period. A model to determine the optimal time of a 
real investment under uncertainty is devised by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and 
further developed by Pindyck (1991). The investor triggers the investment if the 
discounted cash flows are greater than a threshold which rises with uncertainty. 
Simulations make clear that even under moderate levels of uncertainty, this threshold 
can be twice the amount of the investment. Under higher uncertainty, the threshold rises 
quickly to ten or even more times the amount to be invested, indicating a high 
opportunity cost of giving up the flexibility to invest later. 
Managers do not seem to use quantitative option models for foreign direct 
investment decisions (Becker 2005) but may implicitly account for the value of 
flexibility (Howell and Jägle, 1997; Miller and Shapira, 2004). To mirror real options 
reasoning (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004), a simple model of option values will be 
sufficient. Thus we expect that a foreign investor exercises the option to defer entry as 
soon as the value of the waiting option D, which increases with uncertainty σ, falls 
below the net present value C, which shall be a function of the economic prospects µ. 
  C(µ) ≥ D(σ). (1) 
By deciding to trigger the investment, the internationalizing firm acquires a 
growth option to further build up the foreign subsidiary. Just as the value of the waiting 
option does, its value rises with uncertainty. In competitive markets, the growth option 
will be the more valuable the earlier it is available to the firm considering entry, which 
can be reflected by a multiplier α ≥ 1 (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). Including 
the earlier growth option α G(σ) in the case of immediate entry and the later growth 
option G(σ) in the case of deferral, the model reads 
  C(µ) + α G(σ) ≥ D(σ) + G(σ) (2) 
(Folta and O’Brien, 2004). Bowman and Hurry (1993) argue that investors 
perceive very high uncertainty when objects are new to them. Therefore, they assign a 
high value to holding options. Later, in a process of learning, the perception of 
uncertainty may lessen and let the value of cash flows gain importance. The view that 
the option value is more relevant to entry decisions than the net present value is 
empirically supported by Schatzki (2003). An implication is that foreign investors will   8 
align the timing of entry to the course of uncertainty rather than to the contemporary 
economic prospects. Consequently, the model may be simplified by setting the total 
value W equal to the net option value V 
  W(µ,σ) ≈ V(σ) = 0 + α G(σ) - D(σ) - G(σ). (3) 
Provided that an internationalizing firm is waiting for the right moment to place 
the investment, we expect that 
Hypothesis 1. The economic trend in the host country has no significant impact on 
the probability of entry. 
To determine the time of entry, the foreign investor will rather balance the value 
of two dueling options, a waiting and a growth option. The growth option competes 
with the waiting option since, with increasing uncertainty, it suggests to invest whereas 
the waiting option advises not yet to invest. Entry will occur if the net option value is 
positive 
  V(σ) = (α - 1) G(σ) - D(σ) ≥ 0.  (4) 
The shape of the net option value function depends on the way by which the 
growth and the waiting option values rise with uncertainty. If both rose by the same 
rate, the net effect would cancel out. Folta and O’Brien (2004) propose two arguments 
why the growth option may be more sensitive to uncertainty than the waiting option. 
One is that immediate entry is likely to effect a larger market share and higher profits 
than delaying the entry. The second is that the value of the option to grow is unbounded 
while the option to defer is limited to the amount of capital that may be lost. To put it in 
mathematical terms, the second derivative of the revalued growth option exceeds the 
second derivative of the waiting option 







> − . (5) 
If so, the net option value is U-shaped: When uncertainty is comparably low, the 
influence of the waiting option prevails and keeps the foreign investor from entry. High 
uncertainty, by contrast, allows the influence of the growth option to outweigh the 
waiting option’s effect, which leads to a positive net impact of uncertainty.   9
Hypothesis 2. At low levels, the economic uncertainty of a host country has a 
negative impact on the probability of international entry whereas at high levels, it 
has a positive impact. 
Dimensioning the Growth Option by the Share and Amount of Capital 
Pindyck (1988) devises a model of incremental investment to calculate the 
optimal stock of capital for an investment project under uncertain demand. The total 
value of the project is maximized by considering two components. One is the net 
present value of the capital already invested and the other is the value of the growth 
option to invest additional capital 
  W(µ,σ) = C(µ) + G(σ). (6) 
A numerical solution to the problem reveals that even intermediate levels of 
uncertainty require demand to triple before investing the first unit of capital becomes 
efficient. Low uncertainty suggests to invest less than a fourth of the amount that should 
be invested under certainty. In qualitative terms, the model expresses that the value of 
the growth option rises quickly with uncertainty and can be very high as compared to 
the net present value. The higher the uncertainty at entry, the smaller is the optimal 
stock of capital to start with. 
The internationalizing firm has decided to enter a foreign market at a degree of 
uncertainty which makes the growth option just more valuable than the waiting option 
and, on any account, provides it with a much higher value than the net present value. By 
limiting the stock of capital, the investor will focus on the capacity of an initial 
investment to create a growth option on a later investment and pay less attention to the 
expected returns, which are driven by the economic prospects µ. 
  W(µ,σ) = C(µ) + G(σ) ≈ 0 + G(σ). (7) 
In the perspective of internalization, the entry mode is described by the extent to 
which the investor exerts control over foreign operations. The option value of an 
international joint venture is independent of the expected profits in the short run. 
Therefore, we expect that   10 
Hypothesis 3a. The economic trend in the host country has no significant impact 
on the share in capital at international entry. 
In the perspective of internationalization, the extent of entry is characterized by 
the size of investment. The new foreign subsidiary will include a growth option 
regardless of its current returns. 
Hypothesis 3b. The economic trend in the host country has no significant impact 
on the amount of capital at international entry. 
Pindyck’s (1988) model of incremental investment suggests that the value of the 
option to grow increase with uncertainty. In the face of uncertainty, the investor will 
limit the capital at entry. In terms of internalization, uncertainty will have a negative 
influence on the degree of control. The investor may upgrade the engagement as soon as 
uncertainty lessens. 
Hypothesis 4a. The economic uncertainty in the host country has a negative 
impact on the share in capital at international entry. 
With respect to internationalization, uncertainty suggests to limit the size of 
investment at entry and hold the option of enlarging it in the event that uncertainty 
abates. 
Hypothesis 4b. The economic uncertainty in the host country has a negative 
impact on the amount of capital at international entry. 
 
PANEL STUDY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 
OECD 23 COUNTRIES 
Deutsche Bundesbank FDI Statistics 
For the purpose of official statistics on foreign direct investment, German 
investors are legally obligated to report their investment objects to the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (central bank). The reports include simplified balance sheets, figures of 
revenue and employees as well as local and sectoral information. The Bundesbank 
Economic Research Center stores these data in the MiDi database. In principle, public 
access is denied but, under strict confidentiality, provided to visiting researchers. The   11
data are organized in a way that allows for tracking chains of indirect investment. 
Thereby not only direct subsidiaries, but also subsidiaries of subsidiaries etc. are 
assigned to the German investors. The project uses final figures of the years 1996 to 
2000 and preliminary data of 2001. 
In order to gain a set of comparable investment objects, the study was restricted to 
certain countries and industries. The industrialized OECD 23 (-1, which is Germany) 
countries accounted for 87 % of the stock of German foreign direct investment in the 
last year of observation, which is 2001 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003). Manufacturing is 
the most important German industry sector and was chosen for the study, since more 
than 50 % of foreign direct investment are related to these industries. Reports of 
precedent years served as references to distinguish new entrants from former objects. 
Because data series start in 1996, new entrants could be identified from 1997 on. 
Investment objects with a balance sheet total below € 5 mill. were cut off in order to 
prevent artifacts of entry near the exemption limit. The resulting data comprise 5379 
entries by 2282 German investors in 22 countries over a period of five years. 
Measures and Econometric Model 
The timing of international entry may be tracked by a panel of potential investors. 
The MiDi database, however, reports only on those firms that have actually entered a 
foreign country. For that reason it is necessary to switch the point of view and examine 
a panel of host countries that receive entries from an unknown set of foreign firms 
contemplating entry. The Bundesbank data cover the share of entries made by German 
investors. 
The first dependent variable, the probability of entry between the waiting and the 
growth option, was approximated by the number of entries within a country and year. 
The second dependent variable refers to the use of growth options on internalization. 
The share in capital can be measured easily on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 %. To 
investigate entries under uncertainty on the country level, it is sufficient to calculate 
averages of all entries within a country and year as reported to the Bundesbank. The 
extent to which an investor uses a growth option on internationalization is difficult to 
measure on a scale of 0 to 100 %. The investment at entry can be observed whereas the 
desired final size of the subsidiary cannot. Expecting an error compensation among the   12 
investors’ strategies, the third dependent variable was measured by the average amount 
of foreign direct investment for all entries within a country and year. The log of 
investment was used since most investments were small compared to very few large 
investments. The Bundesbank calculates foreign direct investment as the total of 
attributable shares in the registered capital minus owing contributions, capital and 
surplus reserves, profit or loss brought forward, net profit or loss minus deficits 
uncovered by equity, loans from the investor and those from associated companies. The 
database provides an investment figure that reaches through the chains of indirect 
investment and indicates the imputable stock of foreign direct investment for every 
foreign subsidiary. 
Investors make decisions depending on the uncertainty they perceive. As the MiDi 
database is anonymous, the volatility of the host country could not be measured in a 
questionnaire survey but had to be estimated by a correlative. Every month, the OECD 
publishes the six-month rate of change (6mC) of the composite leading indicator (CLI) 
in the member countries. The CLI forecasts the direction and intensity of cyclical 
differences of the economic development from the long-term trend. An alternative 
would be using stock indices. However, the CLI is more country-specific. Firstly, the 
movements of stock prices in the industrialized countries are closely interrelated under 
the lead of the New York Stock Exchange. Secondly, stock indices are usually 
calculated from large companies that operate internationally and thereby refer to the 
whole range of countries entered by these companies rather than to their home countries 
only. The study uses the standard deviation of the monthly CLI 6mC within a country 
and year as a proxy of volatility. Calculating the mean of the 6mC delivers a related 
measure for the second independent variable trend, which is to indicate the economic 
prospects of the host country. 
The timing of entry to a particular host country may not only depend on its 
economic uncertainty and trend but also on other factors of attractiveness to foreign 
direct investment that are subject to change. The country’s technological position was 
measured by the number of patents claimed by foreign companies in the year of 
observation. The country’s buying power was included by yearly data on GDP per 
capita (gdppc). Both time series were taken from the World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM 2005 (World Bank). Time dummies control for overall influences that vary   13
with time. Controlling for constant properties of the host countries such as size, location 
and culture is unnecessary when using a cross-sectional time-series model. 
Various studies employ panel techniques to investigate investment behavior in the 
light of real options (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000; Bloom, Bond and van Reenen, 2003; 
Kalckreuth, 2003). The standard methods are fixed and random effects models using 
“within” estimation. To capture constant influences on the object level, fixed effects 
models introduce a constant whereas random effects models include a random variable 
for each object. The estimators of these methods, however, are inefficient, if the data are 
heteroscedastic. In a model 
  yit = x’it βx + εit (8) 
heteroscedasticity occurs if the variances σjt
2 of the error terms εjt are not the same 
for all objects. Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) models are able to estimate 
the heteroscedasticity function (Wooldridge, 2003). A modified Wald test examines the 
null hypothesis that all variances are equal. For the data at hand, the null hypothesis had 
to be rejected, which suggests to estimate the regression coefficients by a FGLS model. 
GERMAN ENTRIES BETWEEN 1997 AND 2001 
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. The 110 observations are aggregates of 
the entries in 22 countries over five years. The dependent variables are listed above the 
independent and control variables. To interpret the values of the variables share and 
amount, note that they reflect averages on the country level. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min. Max. volatility trend patent gdppc  VIF
entry  110 48.900  48.614  3.000 243.000    
share  110 0.835  0.098  0.445 1.000    
amount  110 9.142  1.056  5.426 11.688    
volatility  110 2.784  2.247  0.263 12.449 1.000     1.02
trend  110 2.895  5.247  -11.170 21.402 0.055 1.000     1.11
patent  110 126552  54108  27985 230729 0.064 -0.303 1.000   1.21
gdppc  110 26885  12508  2873 56381 -0.089 -0.039 0.274  1.000  1.10
   14 
The matrix in the right part of Table 1 shows that most variables are independent 
of each other but patent is correlated to trend and gdppc. The respective variance 
inflation factor (VIF) suggests that it is affected by some multicollinearity. Still it was 
included in the following models; dropping patent as a control variable does not change 
the results remarkably. 
Number of Entries 
The results about the uncertainty to influence the timing of international entry are 
presented in Table 2. Model 1 is the base model and comprises only the control 
variables and time dummies (concealed). Model 2 includes the economic trend. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 1, its influence on the probability of entry is insignificant. The 
log likelihood test with respect to the base model shows that trend does not contribute to 
explaining entry. Comparing the log likelihood and considering the standard errors in 
Model 3 and Model 4 deliver the same result. Foreign investors seem to choose the time 
of entry regardless of the contemporary economic prospects in the host country. 
Table 2: FGLS models of the number of entries to a host country 
Hyp. 
Exp. sign 
















trend     0.3908 
(0.5680) 




























  log likelh.  -510.58 -510.73 -506.55 -506.11 -503.20 
  l/r test  Base model -0.30  8.07***  8.94**  14.76*** 
Estimation with time dummies; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, std. errors in parentheses 
 
The model of dueling real options suggests that the uncertainty have a significant 
impact on the timing of entry. As the likelihood ratio test reveals, adding volatility in 
Model 3 significantly increases the log likelihood as compared to the base model.   15
Including volatility
2 in Model 5 causes another jump in log likelihood. Both coefficients 
are significant with the expected sign, supporting the view of a U-shaped influence of 
uncertainty on the probability of entry as presumed by Hypothesis 2. In the range of low 
uncertainty, foreign investors seem to refrain from entry as uncertainty rises. At high 
levels of uncertainty, they tend to enter the host country with rising uncertainty as the 
value of the growth option overrides the value of the waiting option. 
Capital at Entry 
The growth option model states that the smaller the investment at international 
entry, the larger is the option to grow by a later investment. The influence of the 
uncertainty and trend of the economic development on the dimensioning of growth 
options was investigated with respect to both the perspectives of internalization and 
internationalization. Table 3 reports the results concerning the share, Table 4 regarding 
the amount of capital. Models 6 and 10 are the base models, respectively. 
Model 7 in Table 3 examines the impact of the economic trend on the share in 
capital. Contrary to Hypothesis 3a, the variable trend exerts a significantly positive 
influence on the degree of control over new foreign subsidiaries and significantly 
increases the log likelihood as compared to the base model. The impact of trend is also 
significant in the complete Model 9. 
Table 3: FGLS models of the share in capital at entry 
Hyp. 
Exp. sign 
share  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
4a 
- 






trend     0.0058*** 
(0.0017) 






















  log likelh.  138.79 140.50 138.77 140.50 
  l/r test  Base model  3.42*  -0.04  3.42 
Estimation with time dummies; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, std. errors in parentheses 
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Model 11 in Table 4 tests for the influence of the economic trend on the amount 
of capital at entry. As expected by Hypothesis 3b, the related coefficient is 
insignificantly different from 0. Probably due to correlations (Table 1), including trend 
deteriorates the log likelihood; the variable makes no contribution to explaining the 
amount of capital. It seems that a rising economic trend induces a higher share but is 
irrelevant to the amount of capital. 
Table 4: FGLS models of the amount of capital at entry 
Hyp. 
Exp. sign 
amount  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13 
4b 
- 






trend   -0-0016 
(0.0137) 






















  log likelh.  -134.86 -135.02 -132.81 -132.88 
  l/r test  Base model  -0.32  4.10**  3.96 
Estimation with time dummies; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, std. errors in parentheses 
 
The growth option model expects uncertainty to discourage investment at 
international entry. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a predicts a negative influence of 
uncertainty on the share in capital. The findings of Models 8 and 9 in Table 3, however, 
contradict this proposition. In both models, the variable volatility has no significant 
impact and does not improve the log likelihood. Model 12 in Table 4 examines the 
influence of uncertainty on the amount of capital. The coefficient of volatility is 
negatively signed and significant. There is also a significant increase in log likelihood, 
supporting Hypothesis 4b. The significance of uncertainty is further supported by the 
complete Model 13. Apparently, uncertainty does not prevent foreign investors from 
choosing a high mode of control but it does keep them from binding a high volume of 
capital. 
   17
DISCUSSION 
A real options view to international entry enables analyzing the timing and 
dimensioning of foreign direct investment in a way that may be compatible with the 
perspectives of internalization and internationalization but is more precise about the 
influence of uncertainty. Traditional theories of foreign direct investment conceive 
uncertainty as a downside risk that suggests being careful at international entry. The 
theory of real options recognizes uncertainty as a chance as well as a risk, since the 
returns of an investment can also be greater than expected. Waiting may still be 
worthwhile as it carries the possibility of uncertainty to become less for exogenous 
reasons or be decreased by collecting additional information. However, collecting 
information is easier after launching the investment. Investing to a limited extent 
provides this advantage but preserves the flexibility to invest the major part at a later 
point in time. Enforced by early mover advantages, the value of the option to grow may 
be greater than the value of the option to defer and, on balance, plead for entry. The 
study of German investment in the OECD 23 countries suggests that the uncertainty of a 
host country have a nonlinear effect on the probability of entry. When uncertainty is 
low, rising uncertainty prevents entry, whereas when uncertainty is high, rising 
uncertainty attracts entry. This observation is consistent with the finding that Folta and 
O’Brien (2004) produce in a domestic context and supplements the empirical 
knowledge about the timing of international entry. The theory of real options proves to 
be useful as it provides an explanation for the ambivalent role of uncertainty. As an 
implication for management it asserts that entering a foreign market in the face of high 
uncertainty can be rational even though traditional theories advise not to invest. 
The influence of host country uncertainty on the dimensioning of foreign direct 
investment can be studied both by the perspectives of internalization and 
internationalization. Interpreting international entry as creating a growth option, 
uncertainty is supposed to have a negative impact on investment either way. The 
empirical results are contradictory though. Economic uncertainty has a negative 
influence on the amount of capital whilst it has no influence on the share in capital. The 
economic prospects, by contrast, exert no influence on the amount whereas they have a 
positive influence on the share. Since the value of growth options is driven by 
uncertainty, this observation suggests that investors use the amount but not the share in   18 
capital as a growth option. There is no support for the notion of Buckley, Casson and 
Gulamhussen (2002) that reduced transaction costs and asymmetric information are 
sufficient to provide the investor with the option to take over a joint venture. It seems 
that foreign subsidiaries, in general, are real options but international joint ventures, in 
particular, are not. Joint ventures rather serve as regular investments. Regarding the 
option-related problems of joint venture partnership (Chi, 2000) and the effort to 
negotiate buy-out clauses in order to prevent these problems (Reuer, 2002), this finding 
may not be surprising. Nevertheless, it can help directing future research to the 
perspective of internationalization, since studying joint ventures as growth options 
appears difficult. Even if shared or full ownership seem to reflect decisions about 
investment, they actually measure decisions about control. As the theory of real options 
is a theory of investment, it fits the perspective of internationalization better than the 
perspective of internalization. Feeding this result back into practice, the consequence for 
management would be straightforward. In order to stay flexible after entry, 
internationalizing firms may rather limit their stake than engage in a joint venture. 
Further research is needed to validate these findings since the study is subject to a 
number of limitations. Surveys and laboratory experiments suggest that economists 
abandon traditional net present value rules to stay flexible for future investment 
decisions. For the time being, though, it is no more than an assumption that foreign 
investors apply real options reasoning to their decisions. The model of waiting and 
growth options tries to reproduce basic reasoning and is kept simple to this end but 
might be a quasi theory rather than an true theory of investment behavior. Taken as a 
plausible model, it gives an explanation why German investors choose the timing and 
dimensioning of international entry synchronized to uncertainty. The empirical findings 
brought forward, however, could partly be the consequence of methodological 
shortcomings. The Deutsche Bundesbank database is anonymous and does not allow for 
studying a panel of potential investors that differ by certain properties. The data require 
observing international entries to a country as they occur. In an aggregate figure, we do 
not know whether the unobserved influences on the firm level even out or produce 
artifacts. Factors on the country level are eliminated by the econometric model but may 
be as important to entry decisions as the impact of uncertainty. The measurement of 
uncertainty relies on the presumption that the investors’ expectations are correlated to   19
the economic forecasts collected by the OECD. The study should be followed by a 
survey that may provide a smaller coverage but enable investigating the decision 
makers’ real intentions about using options.   20 
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